2025. What is interesting about conspiracy theories? Social Epistemology.
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A central debate in conspiracy theory research concerns how to conceptualise conspiracy theories in a way that advances our understanding of the phenomena themselves as well as of those who believe in them. This debate remains unresolved, with researchers adopting widely different positions: while some argue for a purely descriptive understanding, others are strongly committed to the view that conspiracy theories are, or can be shown to be, inherently irrational. This paper reconstructs the controversy, arguing that it stems from two distinct scholarly motives: to attain objective knowledge of the phenomena in question versus to defend beliefs and norms that are part of the researcher’s own cultural context. By examining the epistemological and methodological challenges in this field, I highlight how competing frameworks—normative cultural biases versus objective scientific inquiry—shape our understanding of rational belief. When cultural biases influence research, they risk narrowing its scope and undermining the development of a comprehensive understanding of conspiracy theories. Ultimately, even proponents of normative cultural approaches can acknowledge that such perspectives fail to capture the full complexity and significance of these phenomena.
2023. Who is a Conspiracy Theorist? Social Epistemology, 37 (4), 454–463.
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The simplest and most natural definition of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ leads us to the conclusion that we are all conspiracy theorists. Yet, I claim that most of us would not self-identify as such. In this paper I call this the problem of self-identification. Since virtually everyone emerges as a conspiracy theorist, the term is essentially theoretically fruitless. It would be like defining intelligence in a way that makes everyone intelligent. This raises the problem for theoretical fruitfulness, i.e. the problem of how to define the concept in a theoretically fruitful way. I suggest that these problems are currently causing confusion in the literature and present us with a dilemma, the conspiracy definition dilemma. I will present an analysis of the literature and what are on my reconstruction the solutions on offer, and argue that none is satisfactory. Either a) the solution will solve the problem of self-identification or b) it will potentially provide a theoretical fruitful definition, but no account does both.
My presentation, “Who is a Conspiracy Theorist?”
at the 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories (February 2022)
2025. Should we worry about conspiracy theorists rejecting experts? Inquiry, 68 (8), 2820-2840.
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Concerns have been raised by both researchers and authorities regarding conspiracy theorists rejecting experts.
To address the validity of these concerns, we need to delve into two key inquiries regarding who qualifies as an expert on conspiracy theories, and what constitutes an epistemically rational response (from a conspiracy theorist) when faced with expert testimony. The first inquiry presents a challenge when considering a reputationalist versus a realist account of experts. On the reputationalist account rejecting experts may be viewed as little more than rejecting those whom society has collectively deemed as experts. Alternatively, adopting a realist account raises the challenge of determining who the genuine experts are. I argue that the realist account is the more compelling option for pursuing the first question.
Moreover, I explore two prevalent accounts from existing literature that
prescribe how epistemic agents should respond to expert testimony: the Preemptive View and the Community View. Through an examination using the simulation program Laputa, I demonstrate that both accounts are insufficient.
Consequently, I argue that without a clear identification of experts in the broader context of conspiracy theories, the initial concern
Video Abstract
“Should We Worry about Conspiracy Theorist Reject Experts?”
2025. Betting on Conspiracy: A Decision Theoretic Account of the Rationality of Conspiracy Theory Belief. Erkenntnis, 90 (5), 1913-1931.
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The question of the rationality of conspiratorial belief divides philosophers into mainly two camps. The particularists believe that each conspiracy theory ought to be examined on its own merits. The generalist, by contrast, argues that there is something inherently suspect about conspiracy theories that makes belief in them irrational. Recent empirical findings indicate that conspiratorial thinking is commonplace among ordinary people, which has naturally shifted attention to the particularists. Yet, even the particularist must agree that not all conspiracy belief is rational, in which case she must explain what separates rational from non-rational conspiratorial thinking. In this paper, I contrast three strategies to this end: (1) the probabilistic objectivist, who assesses the objective probability of conspiracies; (2) the subjectivist, who rather focuses on the perspective of the believer, and typically views the decision to believe in a conspiracy as a problem of decision making under risk. Approaches (1) and (2) rely on assessments of the probability of conspiracy which, I argue, limits their applicability. Instead, I explore (3) viewing the problem facing the potential believer as a decision problem under uncertainty about probabilities. I argue, furthermore, that focusing solely on epistemic utilities fails to do justice to the particular character of conspiracy beliefs, which are not exclusively epistemically motivated, and I investigate the rationality of such beliefs under a number of standard decision rules.
Betting on Conspiracy: A Decision Theoretic Account of the Rationality of Conspiracy Theory Belief
2024. The search query filter bubble: effect of user ideology on political leaning of search results through query selection
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It is commonly assumed that personalization technologies used by Google for the purpose of tailoring search results for individual
users create filter bubbles, which reinforce users’ political views.
Surprisingly, empirical evidence for a personalization-induced
filter bubble has not been forthcoming.
Here, we investigate whether filter bubbles may result instead from a searcher’s choice of search queries. In the first experiment, participants rated the left-right leaning of 48 queries (search strings), 6 for each of 8 topics (abortion, benefits, climate change, sex equality, immigration, nuclear family, Islam, and taxation). An independent sample of participants were then asked to select one of these queries for each of the 8 topics. With the exception of the topic of Islam, participants were significantly more likely to select a query corresponding to their own political leaning, compared to other queries, explaining between 12% and 39% of the variance.
A second experiment investigated the effect of the political
leaning of the same queries on the overall political leaning of
Search Engine Result Pages (SERPs) in Google Search.
The top six results of each SERP were rated collectively by a third group of participants, explaining 36.3% of the variance across all 48 search terms (p < .00001). That is, (1) participants in our experiments tended to select own-side search queries, and (2) using those queries tended to yield own-side search results when using the Google search engine.
Our results are consistent with the notion of a self-impo
BOOK: 2025. Dimensions of conspiracy: An inquiry into the cognitive and epistemic standing of conspiracy theories. Doctoral dissertation. Lund: Lund University Press/MediaTryck.
2025. Conspiracy Theory and Society Research Handbook. Tsapos, Melina & Coady, David (eds.) (forthcoming). Edward Elgar Publishing.
Co-authored Publications
Dentith, M. R., & Tsapos, M. (2024). Why we should talk about generalism and particularism: A reply to Boudry and Napolitano. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 13 (10), 47-60.
Dentith, M. R., Duetz, J., & Tsapos, M. (2025). Investigating conspiracy theories–introduction to the special issue. Inquiry, 68 (8), 2589-2597.
Ekström, A. G., Madison, G., Olsson, E. J., & Tsapos, M. (2024). The search query filter bubble: effect of user ideology on political leaning of search results through query selection. Information, Communication & Society, 27 (5), 878-894.
Ekström, A. G., Gärdenfors, P., Snyder, W. D., Friedrichs, D., McCarthy, R. C., Tsapos, M., … & Moran, S. (2025). Correlates of vocal tract evolution in late Pliocene and Pleistocene hominins. Human Nature, 36 (1), 22-69.
In Swedish: Vad är en konspirationsteori?
Svensk Filosofi. 23 november 2023
Melina Tsapos 